Weaponization, economic coercion, and interdependency

Interviewer: Today, I'm interviewing Prof. Carla Norrlof, professor of political science at the University of Toronto, Canada, on her article in Project Syndicate of 21st of March, 2025, titled: "How much weaponization can the global economy take?" Links to Prof. Norrlof's bio and the article, which listeners are expected to have read before listening, accompany this interview. Prof. Norrlof, thank you for sparing the time. May I start by quoting two statements in the final paragraph of your article? "A delicate balance between deploying positional advantages and using them as strategic tools must be struck," my emphasis, "and policymakers could avoid the kinds of ruinous mercantilist pitfalls that have run previous eras of globalization into the ground." Again, my emphasis. So my question then is: do we brush off the game theory analysis of nuclear deterrence and end up trading with the enemy, provided there is sufficient capacity on the various sides to harm each other? If there isn't sufficient capacity, the weaker player just has to fall into line. We trade with the enemy until they are sufficiently weak for other reasons that they capitulate. In the meantime, the economies on both sides suffer just as economies have always suffered