Navigating settlement efficiency in a world of CSDR and T+1
Abstract
Settlement efficiency has always been a concern for regulators and supervisors. This issue has recently gained the attention of all stakeholders in financial markets, however, due to: (1) the introduction of the Settlement Discipline Regime (SDR) in the European Union (EU) in February 2022; and (2) the migration to T+1 in the US, Mexico, Argentina and Canada, along with the consequent discussions in Europe about transitioning from T+2 to T+1. There is a perception in the market that the EU settlement efficiency rate is lower than that of other regions; however, there is no available failure rate for the US, and the methodologies used to assess these rates are neither uniform nor comparable. In fact, the EU methodology established by the Central Depositories Deposition Regulation (CSDR) is the most stringent. Furthermore, there are significant differences depending on asset classes, type of transactions and size of markets, etc. Equities markets usually have worse settlement ratios than bond markets, while exchange traded funds (ETFs) have the worst ratio, indicating possible structural problems. Larger markets generally tend to have worse ratios, likely due to higher levels of cross-border investment and more complex products, such as exchange traded products (ETPs) and ETFs. Settlement failures occur for a variety of reasons, encompassing numerous operational and technical issues along the custody value chain. Additionally, factors such as short selling activities and ‘strategic failures’ may contribute, although these are less frequently discussed by market participants. Determining the precise impact of each cause is challenging, as most are typically present during periods of increased settlement failures. These periods often align with high market volatility, elevated trading volumes, high borrowing costs and/or low interest rates. To improve settlement efficiency rates, a comprehensive set of actions should be undertaken by market participants, central securities depositories (CSDs) and regulators. A realistic and achievable target for settlement failures might be around 2 per cent in terms of value, which, while still ambitious, is more attainable than a 0 per cent target. This paper synthesises various analyses and personal experiences, rather than relying on a singular analytic study. This article is also included in The Business & Management Collection which can be accessed at https://hstalks.com/business/.
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Author's Biography
Jesús Benito has extensive experience in the securities settlement industry. He joined the Banco de España in 1988, focusing on policy issues related to payment and securities settlement systems, including efficiency and reliability, systemic risk and the analysis of penalty schemes to improve the Spanish public debt market. From 1994 to 2000, he participated in the European Central Bank (ECB) Task Force on Securities Settlement Systems (SSS). His work involved defining the risk criteria for SSSs to be eligible for monetary policy operations and developing and implementing the Correspondent Central Banking Model for the introduction of the euro in 1999. In 2002, Jesús joined Iberclear, the Spanish Central Securities Depository (CSD) and part of the BME Group. He has been the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Iberclear since August 2006. He has participated in numerous international working groups from the European Commission, European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), European Central Bank and the European Association of CSDs (ECSDA). Jesús is currently a member of the ECSDA Senior Advisory Council, T2S AMI-SeCo and has chaired the T2S CSD Steering Group since its inception in 2012. Currently, he acts as Head of Domestic Custody and Trade Repository Operations at SIX Group, Chairman of REGIS-TR and CEO of Iberclear.