Risk and the shareholder
Abstract
The modern meaning of shareholder has morphed from an engaged owner to a passive provider of capital. Should rights afforded to such passive capitalists be equal to those whose ownership engagement with a corporation is personal and direct? Without the involvement of active and engaged shareholders, the entire corporate system lacks its energising foundation and a very significant risk arises from the relative absence of the effective monitoring and supervising energy that those with ‘ownership’ interests are more likely to provide.
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Author's Biography
Robert A. G. Monks is referred to by The Economist and Fortune magazines as the leading governance advocate in the world. He is the co-founder of ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services), Governance Metrics International (GMI, formerly The Corporate Library) and Lens Governance Advisors. He was Chief Executive Officer of C. H. Sprague & Son Company, Chairman of the Board of the Boston Company and Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Company, Energy Commissioner for the State of Maine, Chairman of two commissions to oversee the administration of the Maine State Retirement System, a founding Trustee of the Federal Employees’ Retirement System, and Administrator of the Office of Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration (Department of Labor) in charge of the private pension system in the USA. Robert has served on several corporate boards and also as Deputy Chairman of the Hermes Lens Asset Management Company in the UK.
Citation
Monks, Robert A. G. (2012, March 1). Risk and the shareholder. In the Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, Volume 5, Issue 2. https://doi.org/10.69554/AXSH1528.
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